Matching and Welfare in Large Marketswith an Application to Monitoring in Teams
Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets
We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition …
Quantifying antitrust damages: Towards non-binding guidance for courts
This report, prepared for the European Commission by Oxera with economic contributions from Patrick Legros and co-authors, provides guidance on the quantification of damages in …
assimakis-komninos
EU competition policy in a global world
This chapter reviews forces shaping current competition laws and initiatives, particularly those easing convergence between the USA and EU. Convergence may ease when countries are …
mathias-dewatripont
The Nobel Prize: What is mechanism design and why does it matter for policy-making?
Mechanism design theory is a major breakthrough in the modern economic analysis of institutions and markets. It revolutionalised the way economists think about optimal institutions …
estelle-cantillon
Pricing of scientific journals and market power
We analyze the empirical relationship between journal prices, their quality measured by their citation counts, their age, as well as conduct of publishers. The database covers 22 …
mathias-dewatripont
Beauty Is A Beast, Frog Is A Prince: Assortative Matching With Nontransferabilities
We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve not only complementarity …
Study On The Economic And Technical Evolution Of The Scientific Publication Markets In Europe
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mathias-dewatripont