Patrick Legros
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    • Computation of the nucleolus of some bilateral market games
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Formation des coalitions et allocation des cots: une approche par la thorie des jeux

1984·
Patrick Legros
Patrick Legros
· 0 min read
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publications
Last updated on 2026
Market Design
Patrick Legros
Authors
Patrick Legros
Professor of Economics (Emeritus)
Patrick Legros is Professor of Economics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and is affiliated with the research center ECARES within the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management.
← Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus 1986

© 2026 Patrick Legros. This work is licensed under CC BY NC ND 4.0

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