We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve not only complementarity …
We study an assignment-with-investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before (ex ante system) and after (ex post system) matching on the labor …
This paper examines the Risk Management and Contract Design aspects of Public Private Partnerships. Part I begins with the question: How is a public private partnership distinct …
Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with …
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple …
We examine in this paper the design of a liquidation, or bankruptcy, policy in a partially centralized economy characterized by imperfect information. We employ a two-period model …