Auditing and property rights
Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with …
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Patrick Legros
Professor of Economics (Emeritus)
Patrick Legros is Professor of Economics at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and is affiliated with the research center ECARES within the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management.
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Moral hazard and capital structure dynamics
We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple …
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Adverse selection and contracts: a discussion
Partners: Assortative Matching in a Non-Transferable World
Global vs. local competition
Third party monitoring and golden parachutes