(Article from Mac Rumors)
Blog on industrial organization and antitrust
In one of his first papers, Steven Levit showed that there are indications that top sumo wrestlers collude. Indeed, a wrestler who loses height games (out of a total of 15) is demoted to an inferior league. By looking at matches involving one wrestler with 7 wins and 7 loses against another wrestler who has already height wins, Levit showed that the first wrestler beat the other one in 80% of the cases, suggesting that the wrestler already insured not to be demoted "helped" the wrestler who could be demoted. This article appears in the book Freakeconomics that Levit cowrote with Stephen Dubner.
A recent New York Times article brings additional confort to these earlier findings. Instead of being based on statistical evidence, like in Levit's paper, the current case is based on hard evidence, in this case the exchange of SMS messages between wrestlers. Interestingly, collusion (letting the marginal wrestle, who has 7-7 win-loses, win) takes the form either of monetary transfers or future exchange of loses and wins.
(UK) The Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission will merge soon. OFT was doing antitrust investigations and therefore had an overlapping mandate with the Competition Commission, but was also responsible for consumer protection, a function that will probably disappear in the merged entity. One argument for the merger is to speed up antitrust reviews and decrease cost: an efficiency argument that certainly sounds familiar for merger cases. Some feel that the decrease in costs is unlikely (see the FT article OFT merger.pdf), but having one rather two hurdles should indeed speed up antitrust reviews. One potential risk to consumers is the loss of a direct advocate (OFT) with a relatively broad mandate, risk that is dismissed by officials but should perhaps be considered seriously if the new entity will outsource the consumer functions of the OFT (the literature on organizations and contracts has indeed highlighted the efficiency role of competing agencies; see for instance "Advocates" by Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, Journal of Political Economy 1999).
The merger Microsoft-Yahoo has been approved on both sides of the Atlantic, see the FT article. One rationale advanced for authorizing the merger is the possibility that the merged entity will be a credible competitor to Google, in particular concerning search engines. Hence the competitive authorities in the US and the EU believed that two will lead to more competition than three.
The launch of the iPad creates ripple effects in other industries. iPad will offer e-books and enters in concurrence with Amazon and its Kindle for distributing e-books. The initial negotiation of Apple with book publishers like Macmillan seems to have been done under the shadow of the "agency model" where the publisher retains most of the rights to set the price and gives 30% to the distributor. After an initial announcement by Apple that e-books will be offered at a price of 14.99$, significantly more than the going price of 9.99$ offered by Amazon on the Kindle, Apple later announced that the price will be adjusted to be similar to that on the Kindle. Interestingly, Macmillan -- and probably other publishers -- renegotiated their deal with Amazon, insisting on shifting to the agency model also. See Amazon Reluctantly Agrees to Higher eBook Pricing, Amazon closes the e-book on Macmillan (FT article). and . Amazon bows to Macmillan over e-booksAt the end of the day, more competition for distributing books seems to have given more power to the publishers, and will eventually lead -- at least in the short run -- to higher prices for e-books.
This shows that the welfare analysis of bilateral oligopolies is complex and that entry on one side may lead to higher prices through what can be called a "bargaining effect."
According to DigiTimes Sstems, some manufacturers of tablet PC have reevaluated the prices of their products following Apple introductory pricing of the iPad. The article points out that these vendors initially intented to price their product 20-30% lower than the iPad, suggesting indeed that the industry is looking at Apple as a price leader. See also Tablet Manufacturers Reevaluating Pricing Options in Light of iPad Announcement.
The introduction of the Apple iPad is seen by firms already offering eReaders as a positive: rather than being afraid that Apple will eat their market share, the competitors hope that the iPad will create a demand push for such devices. Hence, even if Apple gets a lion share of the increasing market -- like they did with the iPod and the iPhone -- the increased demand will benefit all. See a recent Financial Times article on this.
State aids, subventions to local champions or beauty contests favoring national firms through "hidden criteria" are prevalent and are scrutinized by competition authorities. Two recent examples follow.
- Prefence given to national bidders, even if their bid was inferior to those of competitors: bid for state-owned nuclear group Areva in France where Alstom and Schneider Electric won against GE and Toshiba. See areva bid.pdf
- France Telecom recently lost another appeal European courts against the Euroepan Commission for repayment of €1bn of state aid given by the French government between 1994-2002; see france telecom state aid.pdf
A monopsony is a firm that has market power on its suppliers. The distortions in the supplier market are similar to those observed in product markets under monopoly but are less often in the media or in antitrust cases. A recent Korean newspaper suggests that Apple is able to manipulate the supply of flash memory because of his large demand for its iPods and iPhones. See Apple accused of manipulating Flash memory prices.
November 13, 2009
It went fast: Intel and AMD settled their dispute with Intel agreeing to pay $1.25 billion to AMD. It seems that the announcement had some effect on the market: AMD shares rose 21.2% percent while Intel went down by 0.9%.