Welcome to my web site. I am a Professor of Economics at Université libre de Bruxelles (Belgium) and do research at ECARES. My research interests are in theory of contracts, microeconomics, industrial organization, competition policy and regulation. I have taught courses in intermediate and graduate microeconomics, intermediate and graduate industrial organization and antitrust, graduate courses in contract theory. A full vita is available here. See my research page or Repec for my bibliography.
I have been an editor and I am currently the managing editor of the Journal of Industrial Economics. Quality papers in industrial organisation and regulation, both empirical and theoretical, are extremely welcome at the journal. In particular, we do our best to provide very fast first-round responses. This reflects the journal's desire to be very author-friendly, particularly for junior faculty.
My past and current research interests are in applied microeconomic, with an emphasis on contract theory, industrial organization, information economics. I am currently pursuing two main research projects. One is related the role that diversity policy play for human capital accumulation when individuals can imperfect transfer surplus during schooling or on the labor market. Another is the development of an "Organizational Industrial Organization" theory which will be funded by an ERC Advanced Grant starting in January 2015.
- Contract theory: endogenous contract choices in markets with heterogenous agents; moral hazard in teams; design of debt contracts under renegotiation
- Industrial organization: vertical integration and contracting; regulation of network industries; antitrust; choice of varieties in local markets facing global competition; performance of standard setting organizations
- Matching : assortative matching under non-transferabilities; investment and matching
- Education : affirmative action policies, education investment.
- Mechanism design: imperfect communication technology, renegotiation
- Cooperative game theory: cost allocation; formation and stability of syndicates